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Abstract
Fall back equilibrium is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In the underly-
ing thought experiment each player faces the possibility that, after all players decided
on their action, his chosen action turns out to be blocked. Therefore, each player has
to decide beforehand on a back-up action, which he plays in case he is unable to play
his primary action.
In this paper we introduce the concept of fall back equilibrium and show that the
set of fall back equilibria is a non-empty and closed subset of the set of Nash equilibria.
We discuss the relations with other equilibrium concepts, and among other results it
is shown that each robust equilibrium is fall back and for bimatrix games also each
proper equilibrium is a fall back equilibrium. Furthermore, we show that for bimatrix
games the set of fall back equilibria is the union of ﬁnitely many polytopes, and that
the notions of fall back equilibrium and strictly fall back equilibrium coincide. Finally,
we allow multiple actions to be blocked, resulting in the notion of complete fall back
equilibrium. We show that the set of complete fall back equilibria is a non-empty and
closed subset of the set of proper equilibria.
Keywords: strategic game, equilibrium reﬁnement, blocked action, fall back equilibrium
JEL Classiﬁcation Number: C72
1 Introduction
The notion of equilibrium for strategic games, introduced by Nash (1951), is the fun-
damental concept in non-cooperative game theory. The set of Nash equilibria, however,
may be very large and can contain counterintuitive outcomes. In order to overcome these
drawbacks Selten (1975) developed the concept of perfectness as a reﬁnement of the Nash
equilibrium concept. In the thought experiment underlying perfectness all players make
mistakes in such a way that each action is played with positive probability. The no-
tions of properness (cf. Myerson (1978)), robustness (cf. Okada (1983)), strict perfectness
(cf. Okada (1984)) and many others originated from Selten’s work. Although these re-
ﬁnements diﬀer in their exact concept, the common underlying idea is that an equilibrium
should be stable against perturbations in the strategies due to mistakes made by the players
of the game. This line of research culminated into the concept of stable sets (cf. Kohlberg
1CentER and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University.
2Corresponding author: PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. E-mail: J.Kleppe@uvt.nl.
1and Mertens (1986)). A partial overview of this literature can be found in Van Damme
(1991).
In this paper we introduce a new equilibrium concept in which the strategy perturba-
tions are based on another type of thought experiment. The idea is that each player faces
a small but positive probability that, after all players decided on their action, the action
chosen by him is blocked. Therefore, each player has to choose beforehand a back-up
action, which he plays in case his ﬁrst choice action, called primary action, is blocked.
The probability with which a player is unable to play his primary action and has to rely
on his back-up is assumed to be independent of the particular choice he makes. This prob-
ability may, however, vary between the players. It is important to notice that, contrary
to the perfectness concept in which players randomly play all other actions by mistake, in
our setting players choose their back-up action strategically.
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Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of a 2 × n bimatrix game.
the horizontal axis represents the strategy space of player 1, and each line describes player
2’s payoﬀ function corresponding to a particular action (indicated by the subindex). Each
label displays player 1’s set of pure best replies (either action 1, 2, or both) against the
corresponding action of player 2.
In addition to the two proper equilibria on the boundaries of player 1’s strategy space,





1). Here player 1’s strategy is the unique
strategy for which player 2 is indiﬀerent between his second and fourth action. Hence,
2although these actions are dominated by both e2
1 and e2
3 if player 1 plays (a strategy in




2, the coordination point of these two actions determines a
proper equilibrium. The reason is that the concept of proper equilibrium, like many other
concepts, assumes full rationality of all players, which in this particular example implies





4. Clearly, such an analysis requires a high level of rationality by the players on
less relevant payoﬀ levels in the game.
We assume that players are boundedly rational in the sense that they only take into ac-
count the possibility of a single back-up for each player. This is modelled by only allowing
the primary action of a player to be blocked, and not also his back-up action. The set of














2}, where Conv(A) denotes the convex hull of a set A.
The idea behind fall back equilibrium can also be applied to extensive form games. In
that framework one has to make a distinction between the setup with mixed strategies and
the setup with behavioural strategies. In the ﬁrst one players decide on all their (possible)
actions beforehand, whereas in the second setup players determine each choice at the mo-
ment they actually have to make it. In games with perfect recall, this distinction has no
eﬀect on the set of Nash equilibria (cf. Kuhn (1953)). However, for the notion of fall back
equilibria it does matter whether a player faces the possibility of blocked actions once at
the beginning of the game, or at each choice moment separately.
In this paper, however, we have chosen to restrict attention to mixed extensions of
ﬁnite non-cooperative games in strategic form. In the thought experiment players act
by choosing both a primary and a back-up strategy. These strategies together deﬁne a
strategy in the fall back game. Given that a player can choose between m actions in the
original game, the fall back game has m(m− 1) actions to choose from, as players are not
allowed to choose the same action both as primary and as back-up. The payoﬀs in the fall
back game are the expected payoﬀs in the original game given the blocking probabilities.
In the fall back game players are also allowed to use mixed strategies.
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3), only the last
one is not a perfect equilibrium. The focal point of this game is (e1
1,e2
1), and this strategy
proﬁle is also the unique proper equilibrium, as the probability that players play the third
row/column by mistake is signiﬁcantly smaller than the probability of making any other
mistake.
The strategy proﬁle (e1
1,e2
1) is also the unique fall back equilibrium of this game. In our
framework, however, this is due to the fact that back-up actions are chosen strategically.
Therefore, the strategy proﬁle in which both players choose their ﬁrst action as primary
3strategy and their second action as back-up strategy forms the unique equilibrium in the
fall back game, which supports (e1
1,e2
1) as the unique fall back equilibrium.
The ﬁrst result we obtain in this paper is that the set of fall back equilibria is a non-empty
and closed subset of the set of Nash equilibria. We also analyse the relation between fall
back equilibrium on one hand and the equilibrium concepts of perfect, proper, strictly
perfect and robust on the other. We prove that each robust equilibrium is a fall back
equilibrium. Furthermore, for bimatrix games also each proper equilibrium is a fall back
equilibrium, and consequently the intersection between the sets of fall back and perfect
equilibria is non-empty. For games with more players this relation between proper and fall
back equilibrium does not hold. The relation between the sets of fall back and strictly per-
fect equilibria is restricted to 2×2 bimatrix games. For these games the two sets coincide,
otherwise the intersection can be empty.
Similar to the way Okada (1984) reﬁned perfectness in strict perfectness we deﬁne the
concept of strictly fall back equilibrium. It turns out that the sets of fall back and strictly
fall back equilibria coincide for bimatrix games. However, for games with more than two
players the set of strictly fall back equilibria can be empty.
For bimatrix games also the structure of the set of fall back equilibria is analysed. The
main result is that the set of fall back equilibria is the union of ﬁnitely many polytopes.
In the thought experiment underlying fall back equilibrium we assume that only one
action of each player can be blocked. In the ﬁnal section of this paper we analyse the equi-
librium concept that emerges when we allow multiple actions of each player to be blocked.
The main result provided for this concept, called complete fall back equilibrium, is that the
set of complete fall back equilibria is a non-empty and closed subset of the set of proper
equilibria.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we set up notation, formally introduce
and characterise the concept of fall back equilibrium for strategic games, and present some
basic results. In Section 3 we discuss the concept of strictly fall back equilibrium, while
in Section 4 we consider the relations between fall back equilibrium and other equilibrium
concepts. In Section 5 we discuss the structure of the set of fall back equilibria for bimatrix
games and Section 6 covers the analysis of the concept of complete fall back equilibrium.
2 Fall back equilibrium
A non-cooperative game in strategic form is given by G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N), with
N = {1,...,n} the player set, ∆Mi the mixed strategy space of player i ∈ N, with
Mi = {1,...,mi} the set of pure strategies, and πi :
 
j∈N ∆Mj → R the von Neumann
Morgenstern expected payoﬀ function of player i. A pure strategy k ∈ Mi of player i is
alternatively denoted by ei
k, a typical element of ∆Mi by xi. We denote the probability
which xi assigns to pure strategy (action) k by xi
k. The set of all strategy proﬁles is given
by ∆ =
 
i∈N ∆Mi, a typical element of ∆ by x.
A strategy proﬁle ˆ x is a Nash equilibrium (cf. Nash (1951)) of G, denoted by ˆ x ∈ NE(G),
if πi(ˆ x) ≥ πi(xi, ˆ x−i) for all xi ∈ ∆Mi and all i ∈ N. Here (xi, ˆ x−i) is the frequently used
4shorthand notation for the strategy proﬁle (ˆ x1,..., ˆ xi−1,xi, ˆ xi+1,..., ˆ xn).
The carrier of a strategy xi is given by C(xi) = {k ∈ Mi |xi
k > 0}, the pure best reply
correspondence of player i by PBi(x−i) = {k ∈ Mi |πi(ei
k,x−i) ≥ πi(ei
ℓ,x−i) for all ℓ ∈
Mi}. Clearly, ˆ x ∈ NE(G) if and only if C(ˆ xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ x−i) for all i ∈ N.
The action set for player i in the associated fall back game (only deﬁned if mj ≥ 2 for all
j ∈ N) is given by ˜ Mi = {(k,ℓ) ∈ Mi × Mi|k  = ℓ}. Hence, the total number of actions
in the fall back game for player i is ˜ mi = mi(mi − 1). An action (k,ℓ) ∈ ˜ Mi consists of
a primary action k and a back-up action ℓ. Let ε = (ε1,...,εn) be an n-tuple of (small)
non-negative probabilities. The interpretation of player i’s action (k,ℓ) in the fall back
game is that he plays in the original game with probability 1 − εi primary action k and
with probability εi back-up action ℓ.
The fall back game ˜ G(ε) is given by ˜ G(ε) = (N,{∆ ˜ Mi}i∈N,{πi
ε}i∈N), with πi
ε :  
j∈N ∆ ˜ Mj → R the extended expected payoﬀ function of player i. Let pure strategy
(k,ℓ) ∈ ˜ Mi be alternatively denoted by ei




















A typical element of ∆ ˜ Mi is denoted by ρi, where ρi
kℓ is the probability which ρi assigns to
pure strategy (k,ℓ). Note that ρi assigns probabilities to pure strategies (k,ℓ) of the fall
back game, not to primary and back-up actions separately. The set of all strategy proﬁles
is given by ˜ ∆ =
 
i∈N ∆ ˜ Mi, an element of ˜ ∆ will be denoted by ρ.
Deﬁnition Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A strategy
proﬁle x ∈ ∆ is called a fall back equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence {εt}t∈N of
n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {ρt}t∈N such that




kℓ for all k ∈ Mi
and all i ∈ N. The set of fall back equilibria of G is denoted by FBE(G).
In the thought experiment underlying the concept of fall back equilibrium each player
faces the small but positive probability that, after all players decided on their action, the
action chosen by him is blocked. In that case the player plays a back-up action, he choose
beforehand. This is modelled by letting players play the fall back game in which each
action consists of a primary action, played with a probability close to one, and a back-up
action, played with the remaining probability. A fall back equilibrium of the original game
is then deduced from the limit point of a sequence of Nash equilibria of the corresponding
fall back games when the blocking probabilities converge to zero.
Theorem 2.1 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. Then
FBE(G) is a non-empty and closed subset of NE(G).
Proof: We ﬁrst show non-emptiness. Let {εt}t∈N be a sequence of n-tuples of positive
real numbers converging to zero. Take a sequence {ρt}t∈N such that ρt ∈ NE( ˜ G(εt)) for
all t ∈ N. Because the strategy spaces are compact there exists a subsequence of {ρt}t∈N




kℓ for all k ∈ Mi and all
i ∈ N. By deﬁnition x ∈ FBE(G).
Next we prove that each fall back equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. Take x ∈ FBE(G).
We prove that x ∈ NE(G) by showing that C(xi) ⊆ PBi(x−i) for all i ∈ N. Take
a sequence {εt}t∈N of n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero and a se-





kℓ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N. Let i ∈ N and k ∈ C(xi). Then for
suﬃciently large t ∈ N we have that (k,ℓ) ∈ C(ρi















for every (r,s) ∈ ˜ Mi. Since πi
0(ei
kℓ,ρ−i) = πi(ei








for every r ∈ Mi and hence k ∈ PBi(x−i).
Finally we show that FBE(G) is closed. Take a converging sequence {xt}t∈N with
xt ∈ FBE(G) for all t ∈ N, with limit x. For all t ∈ N there exists a sequence {εtr}r∈N of
n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence {ρtr}r∈N converging




t,kℓ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N, such that
xtr ∈ NE( ˜ G(εtr))
for all r ∈ N. Considering the sequences {εtt}t∈N and {xtt}t∈N one readily establishes that
x ∈ FBE(G). ￿
Although the deﬁnition of fall back equilibrium is natural in its interpretation, the fact
that the size of the payoﬀ matrices is larger in the fall back game than in the original game
makes further analysis complicated. Therefore, we now provide an alternative characteri-
sation of fall back equilibrium.
For a (suﬃciently small) blocking vector δ ∈ RN
+, the blocking game G(δ) =
(N,{∆Mi(δi)}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) is deﬁned to be the game which only diﬀers from G =
(N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) in the sense that the strategy spaces are restricted to
∆Mi(δi) = {xi ∈ ∆Mi |xi
k ≤ 1 − δi for all k ∈ Mi}
for all i ∈ N and the domains of the payoﬀ functions are restricted accordingly. Deﬁne the
set of all strategy proﬁles of the blocking game by ∆(δ) =
 
j∈N ∆Mj(δj).
Note that the strategy spaces of the blocking game, with δ > 0, restrict each player
to play at least two of his original actions with positive probability, but also allow him to
play some actions with zero probability.
6Lemma 2.2 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. Let {εt}t∈N
and {δt}t∈N be sequences of n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero such
that εt = δt for all t ∈ N, with corresponding fall back and blocking games ˜ G(εt) =
(N,{∆ ˜ Mi}i∈N,{πi
εt}i∈N) and G(δt) = (N,{∆Mi(δi
t)}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) respectively.
Then for each sequence {ρt}t∈N converging to ρ, with ρt ∈ ˜ ∆ for all t ∈ N, there
exists a sequence {xt}t∈N converging to x, with xt ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N, such that xi
k =  
ℓ∈Mi\{k} ρi
kℓ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N, and πi(xt) = πi
εt(ρt) for all i ∈ N and all
t ∈ N.
Conversely, for each sequence {xt}t∈N converging to x, with xt ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N,





kℓ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N, and πi
εt(ρt) = πi(xt) for all i ∈ N and
all t ∈ N.
Proof: Let {ρt}t∈N be a sequence converging to ρ ∈ ˜ ∆, with ρt ∈ ˜ ∆ for all t ∈ N. We
deﬁne the sequence {xt}t∈N such that for all t ∈ N
xi
















kℓ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N. Furthermore, because εt = δt for
all t ∈ N the strategy proﬁle xt puts the same probabilities on the actions of the game G
as ρt for all t ∈ N. Therefore, πi(xt) = πi
εt(ρt) for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N.
The reverse statement is shown similarly, with the sequence {ρt}t∈N deﬁned in such a
way that equation (1) is satisﬁed. Note that since xt ∈ ∆(δt) and εt = δt for all t ∈ N, and
therefore at least two actions of each player i of game G are played with a probability of
at least εi
t, it is always possible to construct such a sequence {ρt}t∈N. ￿
As a consequence of Lemma 2.2, a fall back equilibrium can also be deﬁned in terms of
Nash equilibria of blocking games.
Theorem 2.3 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. Then, a
strategy proﬁle x ∈ ∆ is a fall back equilibrium of G if and only if there exists a sequence
{δt}t∈N of blocking vectors of positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence
{xt}t∈N converging to x such that xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all t ∈ N.
Proof: We just prove the “only if” part, the reverse statement can be shown analogously.
Assume ˆ x ∈ FBE(G). Then by deﬁnition there exists a sequence {εt}t∈N of n-tuples of





kℓ for every k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N, such that ˆ ρt ∈ NE( ˜ G(εt)) for all
t ∈ N. By Lemma 2.2 there exists a sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N converging to ˆ x ∈ ∆, with ˆ xt ∈ ∆(δt)
for all t ∈ N, such that πi(ˆ xt) = πi
εt(ˆ ρt) for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N.
Let i ∈ N. We show that πi(ˆ xt) ≥ πi(xi
t, ˆ x−i
t ) for all xi
t ∈ ∆Mi(δi
t) and all t ∈ N,
7which proves that ˆ xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all t ∈ N and therefore completes the proof. Let
t ∈ N and let (xi
t, ˆ x−i
t ) ∈ ∆(δt). Then by Lemma 2.2 we can take a strategy (ρi
t, ˆ ρ−i




t ) = πi(xi
t, ˆ x−i
t ).
Since ˆ ρt ∈ NE( ˜ G(εt)) we obtain
πi(xi
t, ˆ x−i







Consequently, πi(ˆ xt) ≥ πi(xi
t, ˆ x−i
t ) for all xi
t ∈ ∆Mi(δi
t) and all t ∈ N. ￿
Since a blocking game with δ > 0 only excludes the possibility for any player to play an
original action with probability one, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game and let
x ∈ ∆ be such that |C(xi)| > 1 for all i ∈ N. Then x ∈ FBE(G) if and only if x ∈ NE(G).
In the thought experiment underlying perfectness (cf. Selten (1975)) players also play a
perturbed game. Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A
pertubation vector for player i ∈ N is given by εi ∈ RMi
, with εi




k ≤ 1. Then the ε-perturbed game H(ε) = (N,{∆Mi(εi)}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) is
deﬁned to be the game which only diﬀers from G in the sense that the strategy spaces are
restricted to
∆Mi(εi) = {xi ∈ ∆Mi |xi
k ≥ εi
k for all k ∈ Mi}
for all i ∈ N and the domains of the payoﬀ functions are restricted accordingly. Deﬁne the
set of all strategy proﬁles of the ε-perturbed game by ∆(ε) =
 
j∈N ∆Mj(εj).
Deﬁnition Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A strategy
proﬁle x ∈ ∆ is called a perfect equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence {εt}t∈N of
pertubation vectors converging to zero, and a sequence {xt}t∈N converging to x, such that
xt ∈ NE(H(εt)) for all t ∈ N.
The diﬀerence between fall back and perfect equilibrium is that in the thought experiment
underlying perfectness all actions have to be played with positive probability and for fall
back equilibria only at least two. This observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 2.5 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game such
that mi = 2 for all i ∈ N. Then the sets of fall back and perfect equilibria coincide.
83 Strictly fall back equilibrium
Okada (1984) reﬁned the perfectness concept to strict perfectness by requiring that for
every sequence {εt}t∈N of pertubation vectors converging to zero there exists a sequence
{xt}t∈N of strategy proﬁles converging to x such that xt ∈ NE(G(εt)) for all t ∈ N. In a
similar way we introduce the concept of strictly fall back equilibrium.
Deﬁnition Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A strategy
proﬁle x ∈ ∆ is called a strictly fall back equilibrium of G if for every sequence {εt}t∈N of
n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero there exists a sequence {ρt}t∈N such





k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N. The set of strictly fall back equilibria of a game G is denoted by
SFBE(G).
Note that if we impose in Theorem 2.3 the requirement for every sequence {δt}t∈N of
blocking vectors of positive real numbers converging to zero, we get in the same way an
equivalent characterisation of strictly fall back equilibrium in terms of blocking vectors.
The sets of fall back and perfect equilibria are reﬁned to a strict concept in the same
way, which means that by the use of Proposition 2.5 also the sets of strictly fall back and
strictly perfect equilibria coincide for all games in which each player has only two actions
available. Since the set of strictly perfect equilibria can be empty for three-player games
with action sets of size two for all players, also the set of strictly fall back equilibria can
be empty if the number of players is three.
However, for any strategic game with only two players, i.e. bimatrix games, the set
of strictly fall back equilibria is non-empty since in that case it coincides with the non-
empty set of fall back equilibria. Before we can prove this result we ﬁrst have to provide
a second characterisation of fall back equilibrium, which can only be applied to bimatrix
games. This characterisation is convenient as it does not make use of perturbed games or
converging sequences.
Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game and let x ∈ ∆. Then,
we ﬁrst of all deﬁne the set of pure second best replies of player i by
PSBi(x−i) =
 
k ∈ Mi |








Note that if |PBi(x−i)| > 1, then PBi(x−i) = PSBi(x−i). Also note that the correspon-
dences PBi and PSBi are upper-semi-continuous.
In the blocking game the strategy of each player is composed of primary and back-up
strategies. The preferences of player i over possible actions are independent of δi, as they
only depend on the strategies of the other players. Furthermore, if the probability on the
back-up strategies, ¯ δj, of player j  = i in a blocking game corresponding to a bimatrix
game is suﬃciently close to zero, the set of best replies for player i in the fall back game
9is, by upper-semi-continuity of PBi and PSBi, the same for all δj ∈ (0, ¯ δj]. Consequently,
the best replies of both players in a blocking game corresponding to a bimatrix game are
independent of the blocking vector δ ∈ R2
++ when δ is suﬃciently close to zero.
Proposition 3.1 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈{1,2},{πi}i∈{1,2}) be a bimatrix game. Then a
strategy proﬁle x = (x1,x2) ∈ ∆ is a fall back equilibrium if and only if one of the following
three statements is satisﬁed.
1. |C(x1)| > 1, |C(x2)| > 1 and x ∈ NE(G).
2. For i,j ∈ {1,2},i  = j: |C(xi)| > 1, |C(xj)| = 1 and there exists a strategy ¯ xj ∈ ∆Mj
such that C(¯ xj) ∩ C(xj) = ∅ and a blocking probability ¯ δj > 0, such that for all
δj ∈ (0, ¯ δj] the strategy proﬁle ˆ x = (xi, ˆ xj), with ˆ xj = (1 − δj)xj + δj¯ xj, satisﬁes
C(xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ xj),
C(xj) ⊆ PBj(xi),
C(¯ xj) ⊆ PSBj(xi).
3. |C(x1)| = |C(x2)| = 1 and there exists for all i ∈ {1,2} a strategy ¯ xi ∈ ∆Mi such that
C(¯ xi) ∩ C(xi) = ∅ and a blocking probability ¯ δi > 0, such that for all δ ∈ R2
++, with
δi ∈ (0, ¯ δi] for all i ∈ {1,2}, the strategy proﬁle (ˆ x1, ˆ x2), with ˆ xi = (1 − δi)xi + δi¯ xi
for all i ∈ {1,2}, satisﬁes
C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2),
C(x2) ⊆ PB2(ˆ x1),
C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(ˆ x2),
C(¯ x2) ⊆ PSB2(ˆ x1).
Proof: We ﬁrst prove the “if” part. We do this by distinguishing between the three cases.
If the ﬁrst statement is satisﬁed, the result follows immediately from Proposition 2.4.
Next assume that the second statement is satisﬁed. Let {δt}t∈N be a sequence of pairs










for all t ∈ N. Then the sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N converges to x and xt ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N. Let
t ∈ N be such that δ
j
t ≤ ¯ δj. We show that xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) by showing that both players
play best replies in G(δt). Since C(xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ xj) player i plays by playing ˆ xi
t a best reply
against ˆ x
j
t in G(δt). Furthermore, since C(xj) ⊆ PBj(xi) player j puts by playing ˆ x
j
t
maximal probability on best reply actions against ˆ xi
t, and as C(¯ xj) ⊆ PBj(ˆ xi) he puts the
remaining probability on second best reply actions against ˆ xi
t.
10We ﬁnally assume that the third statement holds. Let {δt}t∈N be a sequence of pairs
of positive real numbers converging to zero. Deﬁne the sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N such that for all
i ∈ {1,2}
ˆ xi
t = (1 − δi
t)xi + δi
t¯ xi
for all t ∈ N. Then the sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N converges to x and xt ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N. Let
t ∈ N be such that δi
t ≤ ¯ δi for all i ∈ {1,2}. We prove that xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) by showing
that player 1 plays a best reply in G(δt). Showing that player 2 plays a best reply can be
done analogously. Since, C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2) player 1 puts by playing ˆ x1
t maximal probabil-
ity on best reply actions against ˆ x2
t, and as C(¯ x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2) the remaining probability
on second best reply actions against ˆ x2
t. Hence, player 1 plays a best reply in G(δt).
We now show the “only if” part. Let x ∈ FBE(G). If |C(x1)| > 1 and |C(x2)| > 1
it follows from Proposition 2.4 that the ﬁrst statement is satisﬁed. Otherwise, by Theorem
2.3 there exists a sequence of blocking vectors {δt}t∈N of positive real numbers converging to
zero and a sequence of strategy proﬁles {xt}t∈N converging to x such that xt ∈ NE(G(δt))
for all t ∈ N.
Let i ∈ {1,2}. Since xt ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N, if |C(xi)| = 1, then for all t ∈ N there
exists a strategy ¯ xi
t ∈ ∆Mi, with C(¯ xi
t) ∩ C(xi) = ∅, such that xi






t. Take ˆ t ∈ N suﬃciently large, and deﬁne
ˆ xi(ξi) = (1 − ξi)xi + ξi¯ xi
ˆ t.
Then, by the upper-semi-continuity of PBj and PSBj, we obtain that PBj(ˆ xi(ξi)) =
PBj(ˆ xi(˜ ξi)) and PSBj(ˆ xi(ξi)) = PSBj(ˆ xi(˜ ξi)) for all ξi, ˜ ξi ∈ (0,ξi
ˆ t].
Take for all i ∈ {1,2} some δi ∈ (0,ξi
ˆ t] and deﬁne ˆ x such that
ˆ xi =
 
xi if |C(xi)| > 1,
ˆ xi(δi) if |C(xi)| = 1
for all i ∈ {1,2}. Then we show that either the second or the third statement is satisﬁed.
Let us ﬁrst assume that |C(xi)| > 1 and |C(xj)| = 1. We show that for strategy ˆ x =
(xi, ˆ xj(δj)) it holds that C(xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ xj(δj)), C(xj) ⊆ PBi(xi) and C(¯ x
j
ˆ t) ⊆ PSBj(xi).
Note that xi
ˆ t is a best reply against x
j
ˆ t in G(δˆ t). Since xi
ˆ t is close to xi (as xi
ˆ t con-





ˆ t) = PBi(ˆ xj(δj)) we obtain C(xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ xj(δj)). Then, x ∈ FBE(G) and
therefore x ∈ NE(G), which immediately gives the second result that C(xj) ⊆ PBj(xi).
Furthermore, since x
j
ˆ t is a best reply against xi
ˆ t in G(δˆ t), C(¯ x
j
ˆ t) ⊆ PSBj(xi
ˆ t), and as
PSBj(xi
ˆ t) = PSBj(xi) it follows that C(¯ x
j
ˆ t) ⊆ PSBj(xi).
We now consider the case |C(x1)| = |C(x2)| = 1. We show that for ˆ x = (ˆ x1(δ1), ˆ x2(δ2)) it
11holds that C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2(δ2)) and C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(ˆ x2(δ2)). Showing that C(x2) ⊆
PB2(ˆ x1(δ1)) and C(¯ x2) ⊆ PSB2(ˆ x1(δ1)) can be done analogously. Since x1
ˆ t is a
best reply against x2
ˆ t in G(δˆ t) it must hold (since ˆ t was chosen suﬃciently large) that
C(x1) ⊆ PB1(x2
ˆ t) and C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(x2
ˆ t). As PB1(x2
ˆ t) = PB1(ˆ x2(δ2)) and PSB1(x2
ˆ t) =
PSB1(ˆ x2(δ2)) we obtain both C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2(δ2)) and C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(ˆ x2(δ2)). ￿
By the use of this proposition we can prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈{1,2},{πi}i∈{1,2}) be a bimatrix game. Then the sets
FBE(G) and SFBE(G) coincide.
Proof: Since the set of strictly fall back equilibria reﬁnes the set of fall back equilibria we
only have to show that FBE(G) ⊆ SFBE(G). Let x ∈ FBE(G). Then one of the three
statements of Proposition 3.1 is satisﬁed. Let {δt}t∈N be a sequence of blocking vectors of
positive real numbers converging to zero and let for all i ∈ {1,2}, ¯ xi ∈ ∆Mi be such that it
fulﬁlls all conditions of the satisﬁed statement. We deﬁne the sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N such that




xi if |C(xi)| > 1,
(1 − δi
t)xi + δi
t¯ xi if |C(xi)| = 1
for all i ∈ {1,2}. Then the sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N converges to x, ˆ xt ∈ ∆(δt) for all t ∈ N and
for t ∈ N suﬃciently large ˆ xt ∈ NE(G(δt)). Consequently, x ∈ SFBE(G). ￿
4 Relations to other reﬁnements
In this section we discuss the relation of fall back equilibrium to the concepts of perfect,
proper, strictly perfect and robust equilibrium. We start with the relation between fall
back and proper equilibrium (cf. Myerson (1978)).
Deﬁnition Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A strategy
proﬁle x ∈ ∆ is called a proper equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence {εt}t∈N of
positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {xt}t∈N of completely mixed
strategy proﬁles converging to x such that xt is εt-proper for all t ∈ N, i.e.,
πi(ei
k,x−i
t ) < πi(ei
ℓ,x−i
t ) ⇒ xi
t,k ≤ εtxi
t,ℓ (2)
for all k,ℓ ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N.
Note that by replacing εtxi
t,ℓ on the right hand side of equation (2) by εt, one obtains an
alternative characterisation of perfect equilibrium.
The relation between fall back and proper equilibrium is such that for any bimatrix game
each proper equilibrium is a fall back equilibrium, which is illustrated by the ﬁrst example
of Section 1. Only the sets of pure best and pure second best replies determine whether
a strategy proﬁle is a fall back equilibrium, which can also be seen in the bimatrix game
12characterisation of Proposition 3.1. In the concept of proper equilibria however, all lower-
level sets of best replies may be relevant as well. Hence, for bimatrix games, any strategy
proﬁle that satisﬁes the conditions for proper equilibrium also satisﬁes the conditions for
fall back equilibrium.
Theorem 4.1 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈{1,2},{πi}i∈{1,2}) be a bimatrix game. Then, each
proper equilibrium of G is a fall back equilibrium of G.
Proof: Let x ∈ ∆ be a proper equilibrium. Then by deﬁnition there exists a sequence
{εt}t∈N of positive real numbers converging to zero and a sequence {xt}t∈N of completely
mixed strategy proﬁles converging to x such that xt is εt-proper for all t ∈ N, i.e.,
πi(ei
k,x−i
t ) < πi(ei
ℓ,x−i
t ) ⇒ xi
t,k ≤ εtxi
t,ℓ
for all k,ℓ ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N.
We show that for this particular x one of the three statements of Proposition 3.1 is satisﬁed
and hence that x ∈ FBE(G). If |C(x1)| > 1 and |C(x2)| > 1, then the fact that each proper
equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium gives by Proposition 2.4 that statement 1 of Proposition
3.1 is fulﬁlled. Otherwise, take ˆ t ∈ N suﬃciently large. Then, by upper-semi-continuity we
obtain that PBi(x−i
t ) ⊆ PBi(x−i) and PSBi(x−i
t ) ⊆ PSBi(x−i) for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ ˆ t.
In the remainder of this proof we make use of the following notation. Let i ∈ {1,2}.




0 if ℓ = k,
xi
ℓ otherwise.
Note that xi(−k) is not necessarily a strategy, as the probabilities might not sum up to
1. Moreover, if |C(xi)| = 1 for some i ∈ {1,2} we assume in this proof without loss of
generality that xi = ei
1 and introduce the set Qi(t) = {ℓ ∈ Mi\{1}|xi
t,ℓ > εtxi
t,r for all r ∈










for all ℓ ∈ Qi(ˆ t),
0 otherwise.
Now consider the case that |C(xi)| > 1 and |C(xj)| = 1. Take δj > 0 suﬃciently small
and deﬁne ˆ x = (xi, ˆ xj), with ˆ xj = (1−δj)e
j
1 +δj¯ xj. Then we show that C(xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ xj),
C(xj) ⊆ PBj(xi) and C(¯ xj) ⊆ PSBj(xi) as in statement 2 of Proposition 3.1.









13for all k ∈ Mi. Furthermore, since the sequence {xt}t∈N is εt-proper and converges to x it
holds that 1 ∈ PBi(x
j








for all k ∈ Mi. Since x
j
ˆ t is suﬃciently close to e
j








for all k ∈ PBi(e
j
1). Using the fact that x
j
ˆ t,ℓ > εˆ tx
j
ˆ t,r for all ℓ ∈ Qj(ˆ t), r / ∈ Qj(ˆ t) ∪ {1} this
results in
πi(ei
1, ¯ xj) ≥ πi(ei
k, ¯ xj) (4)
for all k ∈ PBi(e
j
1). Combining (3) and (4) we ﬁnd
πi(ei
1, ˆ xj) ≥ πi(ei
k, ˆ xj)
for all k ∈ Mj. Hence, C(xi) ⊆ PBi(ˆ xj).
Since x ∈ NE(G) we immediately obtain that C(xj) ⊆ PBj(xi). It remains to be shown
that C(¯ xj) ⊆ PSBj(xi). Properness of x implies that Qj(ˆ t) ⊆ PSBj(xi
ˆ t) and hence




Finally consider the case that |C(x1)| = |C(x2)| = 1. Take δi > 0, i ∈ {1,2}, suﬃciently
small and deﬁne ˆ x = (ˆ x1, ˆ x2), with ˆ xi = (1 − δi)ei
1 + δj¯ xi for all i ∈ {1,2}. We prove
that statement 3 of Proposition 3.1 is satisﬁed by showing that C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2) and
that C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(ˆ x2). Showing that C(x2) ⊆ PB2(ˆ x1) and C(¯ x2) ⊆ PSB2(ˆ x1) can be
done analogously. The proof that C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2) is similar to the proof that C(xi) ⊆
PBi(ˆ xj) for the previous case with |C(xi)| > 1 and |C(xj)| = 1. Hence, we only have to
show that C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(ˆ x2). Assume without loss of generality that 2 ∈ C(¯ x1). Since
C(¯ x1) = Q1(ˆ t) ⊆ PSB1(x2
ˆ t), it holds that 2 ∈ PSB1(x2
ˆ t), which implies that
π1(e1
2,x2
ˆ t) ≥ π1(e1
k,x2
ˆ t)
for all k ∈ M1\{1}. Since x2




ˆ t(−1)) ≥ π1(e1
k,x2
ˆ t(−1))
for all k ∈ PSB1(e2
1)\{1}. Using the fact that x2
ˆ t,ℓ > εˆ tx2
ˆ t,r for all ℓ ∈ Q2(ˆ t), r / ∈ Q2(ˆ t)∪{1},
this results in
π1(e1
2, ¯ x2) ≥ π1(e2
k, ¯ x2) (5)
14for all k ∈ PSB1(e2
1)\{1}. Furthermore, since PSB1(x2
ˆ t) ⊆ PSB1(e2






for all k ∈ M1\{1}. As a result of equations (5) and (6)
π1(e1
2, ˆ x2) ≥ π1(e1
k, ˆ x2)
for all k ∈ M1\{1}, which implies that C(¯ x1) ⊆ PSB1(ˆ x2). ￿
Note that since the set of proper equilibria reﬁnes the set of perfect equilibria Theorem
4.1 implies that for all bimatrix games the intersection between the sets of fall back and
perfect equilibria is non-empty. The intersection between the sets of fall back and strictly
perfect equilibria, however, can be empty. This follows from the example in Vermeulen and
Jansen (1996) in which it is shown that not every strictly perfect equilibrium is a proper
equilibrium.
The following example shows that for games with three players the set of proper equi-
libria need not be a subset of the set of fall back equilibria.
Example 4.2 Consider the following three-player game in which the third player chooses
the left (e3










1 10,10,1 5,5,1 0,5,1 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
e1
2 10,0,1 0,0,1 5,0,1 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,10,0
e1
3 0,−1,1 5,10,1 0,0,1 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 .
The strategy proﬁle x = (e1
1,e2
1,e3
1) is a proper equilibrium since for a sequence {εt}t∈N,
with εt = 2
t for all t ∈ N, converging to zero the sequence {xt}t∈N converging to
x is εt-proper for all t ∈ N, with xt given by x1





















2. However, x is not a
fall back equilibrium, which can be seen by considering a corresponding blocking game





2. Player 1, however,
plays his third row with zero probability for any strategy combination close to x. Knowing
this, player 2 always prefers e2
3 to e2
2, due to the payoﬀ of 10 in the second row of the right
matrix. As a consequence, player 1 prefers e1
2 to e1
1, which implies that for any sequence
of blocking vectors {δt}t∈N converging to zero there does not exist a sequence {xt}t∈N
converging to x such that xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all t ∈ N. Therefore, x is not a fall back
equilibrium.
One of the fall back equilibria of this game is x′ = (e1
3,e2
2,e3
1), which requires player 1 to
play a weakly dominated strategy. So clearly, x′ is not a proper (or perfect) equilibrium,
as in the corresponding thought experiment all strategies are played with strictly positive
probability. In any corresponding blocking game however, player 2 plays e2
1 with zero
probability for any strategy proﬁle close to x′, and consequently player 1 can maximise his




1 for all t ∈ N.




1). The question whether in general the intersection between the sets of fall back
and proper equilibria can be empty is still open. ⊳
15We now focus on the relation between fall back and robust equilibrium (cf. Okada (1983)).
Deﬁnition Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A strategy
proﬁle ˆ x ∈ ∆ is called a robust equilibrium of G if for all j ∈ N there exists an open
neighbourhood Uj(ˆ xj) of ˆ xj ∈ ∆Mj such that for all i ∈ N
πi(ˆ xi, ˇ x−i) ≥ πi(xi, ˇ x−i)
for all xi ∈ ∆Mi and all ˇ x−i ∈
 
r∈N\{i} Ur(ˆ xr).
Theorem 4.3 Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. Then,
every robust equilibrium of G is a strict fall back equilibrium of G.
Proof: Let ˆ x ∈ ∆ be a robust equilibrium. Then by deﬁnition for all j ∈ N there exists
an open neighbourhood Uj(ˆ xj) of ˆ xj ∈ ∆Mj such that for all i ∈ N
πi(ˆ xi, ˇ x−i) ≥ πi(xi, ˇ x−i) (7)
for all xi ∈ ∆Mi and all ˇ x−i ∈
 
r∈N\{i} Ur(ˆ xr).
Let {δt}t∈N be a sequence of blocking vectors of positive real numbers converging to zero,
and let for all t ∈ N the blocking game be given by G(δt) = (N,{∆Mi(δt)}i∈N,{πi}i∈N).
Then we construct a sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N converging to ˆ x such that ˆ xt ∈ NE(G(δt)) for all
t ∈ N. This shows by Theorem 2.3 that ˆ x is a fall back equilibrium.
Deﬁne N∗ = {i ∈ N| |C(ˆ xi)| > 1} and N′ = N\N∗. Assume without loss of
generality that for each i ∈ N′, ˆ xi = ei
1. We introduce for all t ∈ N the game
Gt(ˆ x) = (N,{∆ ˆ Mi}i∈N,{ˆ πi
t}i∈N). For all i ∈ N∗, ˆ Mi = {fi
1} and for all i ∈ N′,
ˆ Mi = {fi
2,...,fi
mi}. For all i ∈ N′ the payoﬀ function ˆ πi


















j∈N ˆ Mj, t ∈ N. Since each i ∈ N∗ is a dummy player in Gt(ˆ x), t ∈ N,
we do not need to specify their payoﬀ functions explicitly. Then, let ˜ xt ∈ NE(Gt(ˆ x)) for
all t ∈ N. For all t ∈ N and all i ∈ N′ we deﬁne ¯ xi
t ∈ ∆Mi to be the extension of ˜ xi
t ∈ ∆ ˆ Mi
to ∆Mi, in the sense that ¯ xi
t,k = ˜ xi
t,k for all k ∈ ˆ Mi, ¯ xi
t,1 = 0. Further, for all t ∈ N and
i ∈ N∗, ¯ xi
t = ˆ xi. Next deﬁne the sequence {ˆ xt}t∈N such that
ˆ xi
t = (1 − δi
t)ˆ xi + δi
t¯ xi
t
for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N. Note that since ¯ xi
t,1 = 0 for all i ∈ N′ and all t ∈ N we obtain
that ˆ xt ∈ ∆(δt) for suﬃciently large t ∈ N. Also note that since ¯ xi
t = ˆ xi for all i ∈ N∗ and
all t ∈ N, we obtain that ˆ xi
t = ˆ xi for all t ∈ N.
Hence, ˆ xt ∈ ∆(δt) for suﬃciently large t ∈ N, and {ˆ xt}t∈N converges to ˆ x. Take ˆ t ∈ N such
16that for all i ∈ N, ˆ xi
t ∈ ∆Mi(δi
t) ∩ Ui(ˆ xi) for all t ≥ ˆ t. Then, we complete the proof by
showing that ˆ xi
t is a best reply against ˆ x−i
t in G(δt) for all i ∈ N and for all t ≥ ˆ t. Let
i ∈ N and t ≥ ˆ t. First of all, from (7) it follows that
πi(ˆ xi, ˆ x−i
t ) ≥ πi(xi, ˆ x−i
t ) (8)
for all xi ∈ ∆Mi. If i ∈ N∗, then ˆ xi
t = ˆ xi ∈ ∆Mi(δt) and ˆ xi
t is a best reply against ˆ x−i
t
in G(δt). So, assume i ∈ N′. Then it remains to be shown that ¯ xi
t ∈ PSBi(ˆ x−i
t ). Since








for all ˙ xi








t ∈ ∆Mi\{1}. Hence, ¯ xi
t ∈ PSBi(ˆ x−i
t ). Combining (8) and (9) results in
πi(ˆ xi
t, ˆ x−i





t), which implies that ˆ xi
t is a best reply against ˆ x−i
t in G(δt).
Since the sequence {δt}t∈N was arbitrary chosen this implies that each robust equilibrium
is a strict fall back equilibrium. ￿
5 Structure of the set of fall back equilibria
For bimatrix games the set of Nash equilibria is the union of ﬁnitely many polytopes
(cf. Jansen (1981)). The main result provided in this section is that this is also true for
the set of fall back equilibria. In order to obtain this result we need several preliminary
lemmas.
Let us introduce some notation. For a set A we denote by cl(A) the closure
of A and by relint(A) its relative interior. Further, for a bimatrix game G =
(N,{∆Mi}i∈{1,2},{πi}i∈{1,2}) the strategies x1, ˜ x1 ∈ ∆M1 are reply-equivalent if the fol-
lowing two statements hold:
PB2(x1) = PB2(˜ x1),
PSB2(x1) = PSB2(˜ x1).
By V1,...,Vr1 we denote the ﬁnitely many reply-equivalence classes in ∆M1. In a similar
way a reply-equivalence relation can be deﬁned for the strategies of player 2. The reply-
equivalence classes in ∆M2 are denoted by W1,...,Wr2. Note that since the sets of pure
best and pure second best replies are determined by linear inequalities, the closure of each
reply-equivalence class is a polytope.
By the use of Jansen (1993) we obtain the following two lemmas.
17Lemma 5.1 Let H be a face of cl(Vs), s ∈ {1,...,r1}. Then all the elements in relint(H)
are reply-equivalent.
Lemma 5.2 If the intersection of the closure of two reply-equivalence classes is non-empty,
then this intersection is a face of both polytopes.
Given a bimatrix game G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈{1,2},{πi}i∈{1,2}) and reply-equivalence classes
Vs, s ∈ {1,...,r1}, and Wt, t ∈ {1,...,r2}, the (s,t)-fall back component is deﬁned by
FBst(G) = {x ∈ FBE(G)|x1 ∈ cl(Vs),x2 ∈ cl(Wt)}.
Lemma 5.3 For every s ∈ {1,...,r1}, t ∈ {1,...,r2}, FBst(G) is the cartesian product
of two polytopes, which are faces of cl(Vs) and cl(Wt), respectively.
Proof: Consider the reply-equivalence class Vs, s ∈ {1,...,r1}, and let H be a face of
cl(Vs). Take x1 ∈ relint(H) and x2 ∈ cl(Wt), t ∈ {1,...,r2}. We show that whenever
(x1,x2) ∈ FBst(G) it holds that (˜ x1,x2) ∈ FBst(G) for all ˜ x1 ∈ relint(H). The fact that
the set of fall back equilibria is closed then shows that (˜ x1,x2) ∈ FBst(G) for all ˜ x1 ∈ H,
which completes the proof.
Let (x1,x2) ∈ FBst(G). If |C(x1)| = 1, then |H| = 1 and the statement follows im-
mediately. So, assume |C(x1)| > 1. We distinguish between two cases. We ﬁrst as-
sume that |C(x2)| > 1. Then by Proposition 2.4 x ∈ NE(G), which implies that
C(x1) ⊆ PB1(x2) and C(x2) ⊆ PB2(x1). Let ˜ x1 ∈ relint(H). Then C(˜ x1) = C(x1),
and hence C(˜ x1) ⊆ PB1(x2). Furthermore, by Lemma 5.1 we obtain PB2(˜ x1) = PB2(x1)
and therefore, C(x2) ⊆ PB2(˜ x1). Consequently, (˜ x1,x2) ∈ FBst(G).
Next we assume that |C(x2)| = 1. Let ¯ x2 ∈ ∆M2 with C(¯ x2)∩ C(x2) = ∅ and a ¯ δ2 > 0 be
such that for all δ2 ∈ (0, ¯ δ2] the strategy proﬁle (x1, ˆ x2) ∈ ∆, with ˆ x2 = (1 − δ2)x2 + δ2¯ x2
satisﬁes C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2), C(x2) ⊆ PB2(x1) and C(¯ x2) ⊆ PSB2(x1).
Note that by Proposition 3.1 this is possible. We show that these conditions are also satis-
ﬁed for (˜ x1,x2). Since x1, ˜ x1 ∈ relint(H), by Lemma 5.1 we conclude PB2(x1) = PB2(˜ x1)
and PSB2(x1) = PSB2(˜ x1), and furthermore C(x1) = C(˜ x1). Consequently, C(˜ x1) =
C(x1) ⊆ PB1(ˆ x2), C(x2) ⊆ PB2(x1) = PB2(˜ x1) and C(¯ x2) ⊆ PSB2(x1) = PSB2(˜ x1).
Hence, by Proposition 3.1 we obtain that (˜ x1,x2) ∈ FBE(G), and as a consequence
(˜ x1,x2) ∈ FBst(G). ￿
Since there are only ﬁnitely many combinations of reply-equivalence classes we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.4 Let G be a bimatrix game. Then the set of fall back equilibria of G is the
union of ﬁnitely many polytopes.
18A maximal fall back component is a fall back component not properly contained in another
fall back component. From the ﬁrst example of Section 1 it follows that a maximal Nash
subset may contain more than one maximal fall back component and that a maximal fall
back component need not be the face of a maximal Nash subset. The latter result in
particular implies that an extreme element of a maximal fall back component need not be
an extreme element of a maximal Nash subset. Furthermore, Lemma 5.2 and 5.3 imply
that the intersection of two maximal fall back components is either empty or a face of both
maximal fall back components.
6 Complete fall back equilibrium
In this ﬁnal section we discuss a modiﬁcation of the concept of fall back equilibrium. In
the thought experiment underlying fall back equilibrium each player faces the possibility
that, after all players decided on their action, the action chosen by him is blocked. In that
case the player plays a back-up action, chosen by him beforehand. Moreover, we assumed
that a back-up action is never blocked.
In this section we consider the possibility that any number of actions of each player is
blocked. Consequently, players have to decide beforehand on a second back-up action in
case the ﬁrst back-up action is blocked and a third back-up action in case the second back-
up cannot be played either, etc. Hence, each player must decide on a complete ordering
of his actions. If all actions of a player turn out to be blocked the game is not played and
all players receive zero payoﬀ. This thought experiment is modelled by a corresponding
complete fall back game. The equilibrium concept that is based on this thought experiment
is called complete fall back equilibrium.
Note that not playing the game is not an option a player can choose, but that this can
only be the result of a player not being able to play any of his actions. Therefore, the zero
payoﬀ to each player if this situation occurs is arbitrary, as any ﬁxed amount would result
in the same set of equilibria. In order to avoid the possibility that the game is not played
we could also have chosen for a setup in which at most all but one actions of each player
are blocked. This setup leads to a similar, but diﬀerent equilibrium concept, which we will
not discuss.
Let us formalise the concept introduced above. For this we ﬁrst recall the notation
of the second section. A non-cooperative game in strategic form is given by G =
(N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N), with N = {1,...,n} the player set, ∆Mi the mixed strategy space
of player i ∈ N, with Mi = {1,...,mi} the set of pure strategies, and πi :
 
j∈N ∆Mj → R
the von Neumann Morgenstern expected payoﬀ function of player i. A pure strategy
k ∈ Mi of player i is alternatively denoted by ei
k, a typical element of ∆Mi by xi. We
denote the probability which xi assigns to pure strategy k by xi
k. The set of all strategy
proﬁles is given by ∆ =
 
i∈N ∆Mi, a typical element of ∆ by x.
The action set in the complete fall back game for player i equals the set of all order-
ings on the action set Mi, and is given by Ωi. Hence, the total number of actions in the
19complete fall back game for player i equals ˜ mi = mi!. A typical element of Ωi is denoted
by σi, where the action on position s of σi is given by σi(s) ∈ Mi. By Ωi
k ⊆ Ωi, k ∈ Mi,
we denote the set of orders of Mi such that for all σi ∈ Ωi
k it holds that σi(1) = k. Similar
to the concept of fall back equilibrium we assume that each action of player i is blocked
with the same probability, denoted by εi, but we allow for diﬀerent probabilities among
players. Hence, let ε = (ε1,...,εn) be an n-tuple of (small) non-negative probabilities.
If player i plays action σi ∈ Ωi in the complete fall back game he plays with probability
(1 − εi)(εi)s−1 action σi(s) of the game G for s ∈ {1,...,mi}. With probability (εi)mi
all
actions of player i are blocked and the payoﬀ to all players is deﬁned to be zero.





j∈N ∆Ωj → R the extended expected payoﬀ function to player i. A pure strategy
σi ∈ Ωi will be alternatively denoted by ei
σ. Then, πi















A typical element of ∆Ωi will be denoted by ρi, the probability which ρi assigns to pure
strategy σi is given by ρi
σ. The set of all strategy proﬁles is given by ˜ ∆C =
 
i∈N ∆Ωi, an
element of ˜ ∆C by ρ.
Deﬁnition Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game. A strategy
proﬁle x ∈ ∆ is called a complete fall back equilibrium of G if there exists a sequence
{εt}t∈N of n-tuples of positive real numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {ρt}t∈N






all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N. The set of complete fall back equilibria of a game G is denoted
by CFBE(G).
Theorem 6.1 Let G be an n-player strategic game. Then CFBE(G) is a non-empty and
closed subset of NE(G).
The proof of this theorem is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2.1 for fall back equilibria.
As the thought experiment underlying the concept of complete fall back equilibrium takes
into account all levels of best replies and the thought experiment underlying fall back
equilibrium only the ﬁrst and second, one might expect that the set of complete fall back
equilibria reﬁnes the set of fall back equilibria. This is however not the case, as can be seen
in Example 4.2. In this example the strategy proﬁle (e1
1,e2
1,e3
1), which is not a fall back
equilibrium, is a complete fall back equilibrium. This is due to the fact that each action
in the complete fall back game puts positive probability on all actions of the original game
G. Therefore, player 1 is unable to play e1




1) not being a fall back equilibrium.
The setup of complete fall back equilibrium is closely related to that of proper equilibrium.
20In both concepts the replies of each player are ordered in such a way that a complete set
of levels of best replies is obtained. The properness concept then requires that replies of a
lower level are played with some signiﬁcant smaller probability than replies from a higher
level. The concept of complete fall back equilibrium is however more restrictive, as for
each action in the complete fall back game the probability on the actions of the original
game are given. Hence, by requiring that players play a best reply in the complete fall
back game the probability on each best reply level of the original game is ﬁxed. This is
the reason why the set of complete fall back equilibria reﬁnes the set of proper equilibria.
Theorem 6.2 Let G be an n-player strategic game. Then, each complete fall back equi-
librium of G is a proper equilibrium of G.
Proof: Let G = (N,{∆Mi}i∈N,{πi}i∈N) be an n-player strategic game and let x ∈
CFBE(G). Then by deﬁnition there exists a sequence {εt}t∈N of n-tuples of positive real
numbers converging to zero, and a sequence {ρt}t∈N such that ρt ∈ NE( ˜ GC(εt)) for all





σ for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N.









for all k ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N. Note that xi
t puts the same probability on the actions of the
game G as ρi
t for all i ∈ N and all t ∈ N, and that the sequence {xt}t∈N converges to x.
Let the sequence {ˆ εt}t∈N be given by ˆ εt = maxi∈N εi
t for all t ∈ N.
Let i ∈ N and let πi(ei
k,x−i
t ) < πi(ei
ℓ,x−i
t ) for some k,ℓ ∈ Mi and some t ∈ N. Since















Consequently, {ˆ εt}t∈N is a sequence of positive real numbers converging to zero and {xt}t∈N
is a sequence of completely mixed strategy proﬁles converging to x such that
πi(ei
k,x−i
t ) < πi(ei
ℓ,x−i
t ) ⇒ xi
t,k ≤ ˆ εtxi
t,ℓ
for all k,ℓ ∈ Mi and all i ∈ N. Hence, x is a proper equilibrium. ￿
The following example shows that the set of complete fall back equilibria can be a strict
subset of the set of proper equilibria.
Example 6.3 Consider the following three-player game in which the third player chooses
the left (e3










1 10,10,10 0,10,0 0,0,1 1,0,10 0,1,0 0,0,0
e1
2 10,1,0 2,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0
e1
3 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,0 0,0,5 0,0,0 0,0,0 .
The strategy proﬁle x = (e1
1,e2
1,e3
1) is a proper equilibrium, but not a complete fall back
equilibrium. ⊳
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